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THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE:
A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
Marcia Valiante*
Restoration of environmental integrity in the Great Lakes Basin has been only a
qualified success after thirty-five years of efforts pursuant to policies developed by
federal, state, and provincial governments. Many unresolved problems stem from
activities under local government control, yet in the past local governments were
excluded from Great Lakes policy-making. By looking at recent changes in the
powers, interests, experience, and influence of local governments in Ontario, this
Essay concludes that local governments now have the ability to participate mean-
ingfully in Great Lakes policy formation and implementation. To include local
governments would improve the chances of successful restoration of ecosystem in-
tegrity. However, a number of challenges must first be tackled so that an expanded
role for local governments can be most effective.
INTRODUCTION
Environmental governance in the Great Lakes Basin is the work
of a rich amalgam of governmental and non-governmental agen-
cies and organizations at all levels, (roughly) pursuing the
common goals of clean up and sustainable ecosystem manage-
ment. The formal structures and norms of this system were
established by agreement between the federal governments of the
United States and Canada, starting with the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909' and finishing up with the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreements of 1972 and 1978.2 In addition, the eight states and two
provinces3 have become more closely associated and have developed
* Professor of Law, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario. This Essay was pre-
sented at the University of Michigan Environmental Law Society and University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform Symposium: The Great Lakes: Reflecting the Landscape of Environ-
mental Law, September 29, 2006.
1. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters
Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinaf-
ter Boundary Waters Treaty].
2. Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes Wa-
ter Quality, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.ST. 301, superseded in 1978 by 30 U.S.T. 1383,
amended in 1983 by 35 U.S.T. 2371, amended in 1987 by Protocol Amending the 1978
Agreement between Canada and the United States of America on Great Lakes Water Qual-
ity, U.S.-Can., Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11551 [hereinafter GLWQA].
3. The eight states in the Great Lakes Basin are New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota; the two provinces are Ontario and
Quebec.
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their own structures and rules, particularly with respect to water
management and diversions.
With respect to water quality, national, state, and provincial wa-
ter quality policies and programs have been undertaken in pursuit
of the binational objectives. Under these programs, thirty-five years
of efforts to clean up and restore the integrity of the environment
of the Great Lakes Basin have been only a qualified success:
Although much progress has been made, some of the prob-
lems have become more serious, many have not been solved,
and new ones continue to develop. Despite good intentions
and hard work, the strategies and efforts to date simply have
not been effective enough to do the job of cleaning up the
Great Lakes or preventing further degradation. A much more
concerted effort over a longer period of time is essential for
the restoration and protection of the resource and the pre-
vention of future problems.4
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) is now
under review by the parties.' For purposes of the review, the two
federal governments are conducting broad consultation with agen-
cies, organizations, and the public, asking for input on the
effectiveness of the current agreement and its institutions and their
suitability for meeting future challenges.6 At this moment of reflec-
tion, it is appropriate to look beyond the traditional lens of
sovereign governments and theirjoint institutions to the other par-
ticipants in this governance experiment. The qualified success of
the GLWQA shows that, while sustained federal, state, and provin-
cial government commitments and actions are essential, they are
not sufficient. Without concerted action by others, including civil
society, the private sector, and local governments, comprehensive
4. GREAT LAKES REGIONAL COLLABORATION STRATEGY TO RESTORE AND PROTECT
THE GREAT LAKES 4 (2005), http://www.glrc.us/documents/strategy/GLRC-Strategy.pdf
[hereinafter GLRC STRATEGY]. This view is also reflected in public comments on the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, SYNTHESIS OF PUB-
LIC COMMENT ON THE FORTHCOMING REVIEW BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT (2006), http://
www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/lD1588.pdf [hereinafter SYNTHESIS OF PUBLIC COM-
MENT].
5. See GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT REVIEW 2006, http://
binational.net/glwqa_2006_e.html [hereinafter REVIEW 20061.
6. See id. Nine Review Working Groups have convened to discuss a range of issues. See
GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT REVIEW: SUMMARIES OF QUARTERLY REPORTS
SUBMITTED TO AGREEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE 1 (2006), http://binational.net/gwqa/
1stQuarterlyReports-SummariesApr28toJul 206ENG.pdf.
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clean-up will not be achieved and further degradation will not be
prevented.
This Essay will reflect on the role that local governments play
within this system-primarily in terms of their relationship to
achievement of the goals of the GLWQA, but also more generally
with respect to environmental protection in the Great Lakes Basin-
and what role they might play in the future. Specifically, this Essay
will address, from a Canadian perspective, the importance of local
government actions to achieving the common goals; the effective-
ness of local actions; the constraints on local governments;
appropriate roles for them in the future; and how local govern-
ments can be included in more meaningful ways.
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND GREAT LAKES
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Environmental issues facing the Great Lakes Basin are numer-
ous and reflect both a historical legacy of serious chemical
contamination and ongoing actions inconsistent with GLWQA ob-
jectives. Leading issues of concern include: chemical and
bacteriological pollution of surface and groundwater from point
sources and non-point sources, both past and present; degrada-
tion, loss, and fragmentation of natural systems and habitat;
resource exploitation; invasive species introduction; water remov-
als; and climate change
Even for issues fully within federal or provincial jurisdiction, lo-
cal interests are affected." It is local communities that live with the
economic, social, and environmental consequences of senior gov-
ernments' policies. Many people within those communities are
differentially affected,9 and it is appropriate that those voices be
heard in the making of policy.
7. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, TWELFTH BIENNIAL REPORT ON GREAT LAKES
WATER QUALITY 5-6,13, 25-27, 47-49 (2004), http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/
12br/pdf/l2thbrfulle.pdf.
8. Regulation of polluting industries, for example, affects local environmental quality.
In addition, transportation, immigration, trade, and tax policies have a significant impact on
growth and development patterns.
9. See NEIL BRADFORD, PLACE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY: TOWARDS A NEW URBAN AND
COMMUNITY AGENDA FOR CANADA 2 (2005), http://www.cprn.org/en/doc.cfm?doc=1186.
Neil Bradford notes that poverty and polarization have increased in certain neighborhoods
in Canadian cities, disproportionately impacting those already vulnerable, including Abo-
riginal peoples, recent immigrants, single-parent families, and elderly women. Id.
SUMMER 2007] 1057
1058 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Local government actions and inaction also directly influence
many of the priority environmental issues facing the Great Lakes
region. For example, in Ontario local governments control most
industrial sources of water pollution through the adoption and en-
forcement of sewer use bylaws.' Of the 260 municipalities that
have such bylaws (out of 446 municipalities), only a handful have
stringent limits on industrial pollutants entering the sewers." Once
in the sewers, these pollutants then go to municipal sewage treat-
ment plants (STP) . However, Ontario STPs "are not designed to
treat persistent organic compounds, toxic metals and many other
contaminants routinely discharged to sewers; these substances are
not normally monitored in the effluents of STPs; and there are no
legal limits in certificates of approval for STPs to control their dis-
charge to the environment.
' 3
Until recently, Ontario had fifteen municipal STPs discharging
into the Great Lakes with only primary treatment, and even then,
there was a forty percent rate of non-compliance with the most ba-
sic effluent standards that apply to primary treatment.' 4 For plants
with secondary treatment, there is a twenty-five percent rate of
non-compliance with regulatory requirements. ' However,
"[d]espite an apparent problem with non-compliance at many
municipal STPs, [the Ministry of the Environment] very rarely
10. ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO, CHOOSING OUR LEGACY: 2003-2004
ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2004), http://www.eco.on.ca/english/publicat/ar2003.pdf. The over-
whelming majority of industries discharge contaminants to water via the local sewer system
rather than directly to surface waters. It has been estimated that at least 12,000 commercial
and industrial facilities discharge contaminants to Ontario sewers, while only about 200
facilities discharge directly to surface waters. In addition, some thirty municipal sewage
treatment plants take landfill leachate for treatment. Id.
11. Id.
12. In Ontario, municipal governments have the responsibility for managing waste-
water collected through their sewer systems. Municipal Act 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, § 11 (3).
More than fifty percent of municipal governments own and operate their own treatment
plants, with the rest contracting out operation, mostly to the Ontario Clean Water Agency
(OCWA). See generally HON. DENNIS R. O'CONNOR, REPORT OF THE WALKERTON INQUIRY,
PART Two: A STRATEGY FOR SAFE DRINKING WATER (2002), http://
www.attorneygeneraljus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/walkerton/part2/. OCWA is a crown
agency of the province, established in 1993 and accountable to the Legislature through the
Minister of the Environment. See ABOUT OCWA: COMPANY OVERVIEW, http://
www.ocwa.com/home/about/index.asp?id=l. All wastewater treatment plants operate under
provincially issued certificates of approval, which specify the contaminant effluent limits.
Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O., ch. 0.40, § 53 (1990).
13. ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO, PLANNING OUR LANDSCAPE: 2004-
2005 ANNUAL REPORT 128 (2005), http://www.eco.on.ca/english/publicat/ar2004.pdf.
14. ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO, THINKING BEYOND THE NEAR AND
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prosecutes STP operators." 6 It is thus not surprising that, of the
seventeen "Areas of Concern" (AOC) in Ontario, ten have munici-
pal wastewater pollution as a major problem contributing to
beneficial use impairments, such as beach closings.17 Surface water
quality in Ontario AOCs is also adversely affected by combined
sewer overflows, in which the material in combined sanitary and
18storm sewers bypasses the treatment plants during storm events.
Urban storm water runoff containing oils, pathogens, pesticides,
and other contaminants is a major source of surface water degra-
dation in the Great Lakes Basin.' 9
Rural wastewater systems are also a concern for water quality.
The authority to approve and oversee the more than 1.2 million
septic systems in Ontario was transferred from the province to mu-
nicipal governments in 1998.20 The statutory provisions do not
require local governments to re-inspect septic systems, but do allow
them to establish such programs, although only a few have done
so. Most rely on education and matching grants to encourage the
upgrading of facilities. 2 However, the high levels of rural ground-
water contamination suggest that a large number of septic systems
23
are failing to adequately treat wastewater.
Another threat to water quality under municipal authority is
waste management practice. Municipal programs determine the
waste disposal options of residents and influence their disposal
practices. 24 Despite a province-wide target of sixty percent diversion
from landfill into recycling by 2008, most household waste
generated in Ontario is still disposed of in municipally owned and
16. Id. at 46.
17. See generally ENVIRONMENT CANADA, CANADA'S RAP PROGRESS REPORT 2003,
http://www.on.ec.gc.ca/water/raps/report_2O03/Introduction_e.html.
18. ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO, supra note 14, at 41-42.
19. PRIORITIES 2001-2003: PRIORITIES AND PROGRESS UNDER THE GREAT LAKES
WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT 79 (2003) http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/
0103prienglish/ (Report to the International Joint Commission by the Great Lakes Water
Quality Board, the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board, the International Air Quality Advi-
sory Board, and the Council of Great Lakes Research Managers, September 2003).
20. See Building Code Act, 1992 S.O., ch. 23 (Can.).
21. See ONTARIO MINISTRY OF MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS AND HOUSING, SEPTIC SYSTEM RE-
INSPECTIONS 3 (2001), http://www.obc.mah.gov.on.ca/userfiles/page-attachments/library/
4/14003 59372_10435_1336411 _septicEnglish..pdf.
22. See, e.g., ONTARIO RURAL WASTEWATER CENTRE, COURSES AND WORKSHOPS, http://
www.orwc.uoguelph.ca/Courses/coursesmain.htm.
23. See Clean Water Act, 2006 S.O., ch. 22, § 112 (Can.) (authorizing the province to
adopt regulations requiring mandatory re-inspection of septic systems in areas that are
sources of drinking water).
24. For example, through the availability of curbside recycling and composting pro-
grams, bag limits on waste disposal, etc.
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operated landfill sites.2 The province regulates these sites, but it
"lacks the information necessary to monitor and regulate Ontario's
landfill sites effectively."2 6 There is a particular concern with lack of
monitoring at older landfill sites, both active and closed.27
One of the most significant local responsibilities affecting envi-
ronmental quality is the regulation of land use. The International
Joint Commission first studied the issue in the 1970s and con-
cluded that:
[t]he conversion of land over many decades from its natural
covering of mostly forest to more intensive ... crops has been
a major factor in the degradation of water and other compo-
nents of the Great Lakes ecosystem .... [T]he Great Lakes
are being polluted from land drainage sources. Such pollu-
tion occurs most seriously from land areas of intensive
agricultural and urban use.28
Twenty-five years later, the International Joint Commission has
adopted "urbanization" as one of its priorities to reflect the con-
29tinuing problems associated with land use patterns.
Municipalities in Ontario, through exercise of powers under the
Planning Act,30 take the lead in determining the location, type, and
density of development within their boundaries. While the prov-
ince sets broad policy objectives and has an oversight role,2' most
25. See MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, How ONTARIO MANAGES ITS WASTE: THE BA-
SIC FACTS AND FIGURES (2006), http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/news/2006/
083101.htm. Of the 13.3 million tonnes of household, institutional and commercial waste
generated in Ontario every year, 3.3 million tonnes are diverted from landfill through recy-
cling programs. Of the 10 million tonnes remaining, sixty percent is disposed of in Ontario
landfills. The rest is disposed in landfills out of the province, with a small amount being
disposed of by incineration. Id.
26. ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO, NEGLECTING OUR OBLIGATIONS:
2005-2006 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2006), http://www.eco.on.ca/english/publicat/ar2005-en-
report._01 .pdf.
27. Id. at 33-38.
28. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, POLLUTION IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN FROM
LAND USE ACTIVITIES: SUMMARY 1 (1980), http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/
ID501.pdf.
29. See PRIORITIES 2003-2005: PRIORITIES AND PROGRESS UNDER THE GREAT LAKES
WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT 85 (2006), http://www.canamglass.org/glwqa/files/
prioritiesfullreport.pdf.
30. Planning Act, R.S.O., ch. P.13 (1990)(requiring municipalities to adopt official
plans and providing authority for zoning and subdivision of land). Zoning and public works
must conform to official plan policies once the plan is approved. Id. § 24(1).
31. See, e.g., id. § 17(24) (appeal of official plans), § 34(19) (appeal of zoning bylaws),
§ 51(39) (appeal of subdivision approvals). The province has adopted a "Provincial Policy
Statement" that must be followed when planning decisions are made at every level. ONTARIO
MINISTRY OF MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS AND HOUSING, PROVINCIAL POLICY STATEMENT (2005)
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land use decisions are made lot by lot by municipal councils or
committees. Issues such as whether wetlands will be drained and
filled, whether agricultural land, recharge areas, watercourses,
shorelines or woodlots will be protected from development,
whether "sprawl"-low density, separated use, auto-dependent de-
velopment on the urban fringe-will be allowed, what storm water
management measures will be required, what types of transporta-
tion will be favored, whether brownfields will be redeveloped, and
similar decisions are all under the control of local authorities.2
The outcomes of such decisions are important determinants of air
and water quality, water resource availability and habitat quality.
The overall record of this "tyranny of small decisions" is problem-
atic.33
Local government actions also influence water conservation and
use. About eighty-two percent of the Ontario population receives
its drinking water through communal water treatment and distri-
bution systems.34 Municipal governments own most of these
systems, with a few in Northern Ontario owned by private water or
industrial companies 3 About seventy percent are operated directly
by municipalities, twenty-three percent are operated on behalf of
municipal governments through contracts with the Ontario Clean
Water Agency, and the rest are operated through contracts with
private companies.3 6 The quality of a system (for example, whether
there are large water losses from aging infrastructure) and local
water utilities' decisions on metering and pricing have an impact
(adopted by Order in Council 140/2005), http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page1485.aspx. Also,
some official plans need provincial approval, and many planning decisions can be appealed
to a provincial tribunal, the Ontario Municipal Board, which has the power to overrule local
councils. Id. Part I.
32. Id. Developments in flood plains or developments that entail shoreline or stream
alteration require permits from watershed-based Conservation Authorities. Content of Con-
servation Authority Regulations under Subsection 28(1) of the Act: Development,
Interference with Wetlands and Alterations to Shorelines and Watercourses, 0. Reg. 97/04,
§ 4. Conservation Authorities are run by boards largely comprised of councilors from con-
stituent municipalities and are funded partly by the province and partly by the
municipalities. Conservation Authorities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.27. All have watershed plans,
which are mostly implemented through local planning instruments. See CONSERVATION Au-
THORITIES OF ONTARIO: MANDATE, http://www.conservation-ontario.on.ca/about/
mandate.html.
33. EXTERNAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITIES AND COMMUNITIES, FROM RESTLESS
COMMUNITIES TO RESILIENT PLACES: BUILDING A STRONGER FUTURE FOR ALL CANADIANS 51
(2006), http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/eaccc-ccevc/alt_formats/pdf/eaccc_rep~ccevc-rap
_e.pdf.
34. O'CONNOR, supra note 12, at 278.
35. Id. at 279 n.7.
36. Id. at 279.
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on levels of water usage and availability. Conservation is often ig-
nored, even though per capita water use in Canada is second
highest in the world (second only to the United States), and some
two to four times that in Europe,37 and even though some areas of
southern Ontario experienced drought in the late 1990s.3 8 Some
municipalities have adopted bylaws restricting nonessential uses,
such as lawn watering, during periods of drought.
3 9
The provision and maintenance of infrastructure for roads, tran-
sit, water, and wastewater is primarily a municipal responsibility.0
During the 1990s, senior levels of government reduced funding
and downloaded responsibility for affordable housing and social
services onto municipalities. 4' This occurred at a time when growth
put added pressure on municipalities for expanded services, but
limited sources of revenue delayed investment and led to a serious
situation of deteriorating infrastructure. 2 Ontario is projected to
43grow by another 4 million people over the next twenty-five years,
so infrastructure investment and growth management will be major
determinants of Great Lakes water quality into the future.
Despite their importance at the center of many environmental
issues affecting the Great Lakes Basin, local governments are all
but ignored in the formal agreements establishing the present sys-
tem of Great Lakes governance. Because of the international status
of the Great Lakes, the two national governments have been the
main players in negotiating the water quality framework.4 Federal,
state, and provincial officials are the main participants in govern-
ing structures.
Local governments are mentioned in the 1978 Great Lakes Wa-
ter Quality Agreement only in conjunction with wastewater
treatment plant operation,45 yet a number of the Agreement's pro-
37. Martin Mittelstaedt, Water Growing Scarce, Report Says, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL,
Dec. 4, 2003, at A6 (discussing the Statistics Canada report, human activity, and the envi-
ronment).
38. See ONTARIO MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES: Low WATER, http://
www.mnr.gov.on.ca/mnr/water/p774.html.
39. See, e.g., Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Ontario, By-law Respecting the Out-
door Use of Water, 03-025 (May 13, 2003).
40. Municipal Act, 2001 S.O., ch. 25, § 11 (3).
41. BIG CITY MAYORS' CAUCUS, OUR CITIES, OUR FUTURE: ADDRESSING THE FISCAL
IMBALANCE IN CANADA'S CITIES TODAY 32 (2006), http://www.fcm.ca/english/documents/
bcmcfinal.pdf.
42. Id.
43. MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE RENEWAL, PLACES TO GROW: GROWTH PLAN
FOR THE GREATER GOLDEN HORSESHOE 12 (2006) (adopted by Order in Council 1221/2006),
http://w-w.pir.gov.on.ca/english/growth/gghdocs/FPLAN-ENG-WEB-ALL.pdf.
44. See generally Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1; GLWQA, supra note 2; Great
Lakes Fisheries Convention Act, R.S.C., ch. F-17 (1985).
45. GLWQA, supra note 2, annex 3.
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visions ultimately rely on municipal cooperation or active engage-
ment for their achievement.
Annex 2, Remedial Action Plans (RAP) and Lakewide Manage-
ment Plans, requires development and implementation of RAPs in
areas of concern, which are localized sites suffering impaired bene-
ficial uses. Setting priorities and implementing the remedial
actions require the active support and participation of local gov-
ernments. In practice, the parties work in collaboration with local
governments, industry, and citizens in pursuing RAP clean up. 6
Annex 3, Control of Phosphorus, requires development and im-
plementation of programs for the construction and operation of
municipal wastewater treatment facilities and of non-point source
programs and measures, including urban drainage control. 7
Annex 13, Pollution from Non-Point Sources, targets inputs of
contaminants from urban and agricultural drainage, with a focus
on land-based activities, watershed management and wetlands
threatened by development, all of which are under the primary
authority of local governments. Local public health authorities
monitor beaches for the presence of pathogens.
Annex 16, Pollution from Contaminated Groundwater, focuses
on the control of sources of contamination. Many of these sources
are under the control of local governments.
49
Within Ontario, national commitments in the GLWQA are im-
plemented through a federal-provincial agreement, known as the
Canada-Ontario Agreement (COA) .50 The present agreement,
signed in 2002, specifies goals and outcomes, and actions to be
taken by both governments over the five-year life of the agree-
ment." A number of the actions relate to RAP implementation and
municipal STPs, but municipalities do not participate in COA ex-
cept in an advisory role. 2 COA expires in 2007 and is currently
46. See id. annex 2.
47. See id. annex 3
48. See id. annex 13.
49. See id. annex 16. For example, landfill sites and septic systems are controlled by lo-
cal governments.
50. See generally CANADA-ONTARIO AGREEMENT RESPECTING THE GREAT LAKES BASIN
ECOSYSTEM (2002), http://www.on.ec.gc.ca/laws/coa/coapdf/coaagreement~e.pdf
[hereinafter Canada-Ontario Agreement].
51. See generaUy id.
52. See ENVIRONMENT CANADA, FINAL REPORT: REVIEW OF THE CANADA-ONTARIO
AGREEMENT ON THE GREAT LAKES BASIN ECOSYSTEM 17 (2006), http://www.on.ec.gc.ca/
greatlakes/98096EE2-DF3C-48B2-98BD-C3DA8261C35D/COA-FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter
CANADA-ONTARIO FINAL REPORT]. Municipal representatives sit on the Great Lakes Innova-
tion Committee, which advises the COA Management Committee. See generally
ENVIRONMENT CANADA, supra.
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under review. 3 One finding of the review is that municipalities ac-
complish more than the parties in terms of getting work done
under COA.54 The review recommends broadening the focus to
include more issues affecting the ecosystem, including urbaniza-
tion and land use, and expanding decision-making under COA to
include municipalities and others with a direct stake in the success
of the effort.
55
Local governments are demanding a greater role in formal
Great Lakes governance. The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities
Initiative participated in the United States Great Lakes Regional
Collaboration and now participates in the GLWQA review process
and seeks to have cities included as "full partners with the other
orders of government" in the next Agreement. 6 Many citizens par-
ticipating in the GLWQA review identified the need for greater
attention to land use and urbanization as a way of making the
agreement more effective. 7
II. Is THERE A ROLE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
IN GREAT LAKES GOVERNANCE?
There are different ways to address Great Lakes water quality
problems that stem from actions under local government control.
One option would be to amend the GLWQA to include specific
objectives for reducing contaminants from STPs and non-point
sources, while leaving implementation up to domestic legal
mechanisms (such as an expanded COA in Ontario). The RAP
provisions could also be amended to redefine the meaning of
beneficial use impairments to reflect broader concerns with storm
water management and urbanization and to set standards to stimu-
late adoption of local best practices. While these changes should
be made, on their own they are not likely to be entirely successful.
The top-down approach of policy-making by senior governments
with implementation by local governments has been only partially
effective. Unless local governments are included in the goal-setting
and decision-making stages, they have the potential to act as spoil-
ers of the plans set down by senior governments. Particularly given
53. See generally ENVIRONMENT CANADA, supra note 52.
54. Id. at 36.
55. See id. at 32, 37.
56. GREAT LAKES AND ST. LAwRENCE CITIES INITIATIVE, RESOLUTION 4-2006M 4-6
(2006), http://wv.glslcities.org/Final%202006%20Resolutions-complete.pdf; see also
GREAT LAKES AND ST. LAWRENCE CITIES INITIATIVE: ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006 8 (2006),
http://www.glslcities.org/Annual%20Report%2005_06%206.16.06_online.doc.
57. See SYNTHESIS OF PUBLIC COMMENT, supra note 4, at 28.
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the large local role in land use, sewage treatment and storm water
management, a more comprehensive and inclusive strategy will be
necessary to make significant progress.
Creative and adaptive solutions are necessary, and given the
variability between municipalities in Ontario, local input is re-
quired to find what works best under varying conditions. Active
and continuing community support is also necessary to achieve the
goals of ecosystem restoration and sustainable development. At the
same time, national and provincial policies play out differently in
different communities and equity remains a concern. Because both
ordinary citizens and traditionally disadvantaged groups generally
have more political influence at the local level than with senior
governments, local governments play a key, bridging role.
This is not to argue that the top-down approach should be
abandoned in favor of an exclusively bottom-up approach. There
are advantages to both approaches and including local govern-
ments in policy-making as well as implementation should capitalize
on the strengths their enhanced role will bring, while continuing
to build on the strengths of senior levels of government. A collabo-
rative approach is called for.
Any consideration of how to include local governments in Great
Lakes governance requires an assessment of their capacity and the
challenges restricting their greater involvement. In the past, Cana-
dian municipal governments in the Great Lakes Basin have been
constrained legally, financially, and politically in their ability to
fully address the environmental issues facing them. As a result, they
were never included as partners in Great Lakes policy formation.
As the next section discusses, the powers of local governments have
changed significantly in recent years, and as a result, their auton-
omy and capacity to play a meaningful role has increased.
However, there are still important challenges that must be ad-
dressed.
A. Legal Powers of Canadian Municipal Governments:
Legally, local governments are the "constitutional orphans of
Canada" in that they have no independent constitutional status or
powers in Canadian law.5S The only mention of "municipal institu-
tions" in the Constitution Act, 1867, is to assign them to provinces
58. Michael Mendelson, The Emancipation of Cities, in TORONTO: CONSIDERING SELF-
GOVERNMENT 73 (Mary W. Rowe ed., 2000).
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as a matter of exclusive provincial legislative authority. 9 The pre-
vailing reality in Ontario is that municipalities owe their existence,
structure, and powers to provincial statutes, and thus are legally
"creatures of [province] .,,60 There is no independent right to local
self-government recognized by the courts in Canada."
The structure of municipal government in Ontario is the result
of both historical factors and Canadian federalism. The structure
of local government was established prior to Confederation in the
first Municipal Act, known as the Baldwin Act of 1849.62 Numerous
cities and towns were long in existence by then, most established as
corporations, but the British colonial government administered
local affairs.6 3 Different studies of the origins of local government
in Canada emphasize different contributing factors, including "the
influence of democratic reform, the anti-democratic views of elite
family compacts, and the requisites of colonial administration and
protection from American intrusion., 64 These competing factors
contributed to the rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada in the
1830s, which led directly to the gradual transfer of powers to local
bodies and the passage of the Baldwin Act. 6 5 Under the Baldwin
Act, a common framework was developed for the incorporation
and governance of municipalities by locally elected councils. Dis-
cussions about the appropriate structure and role of local
governments in Canada have reflected a tension between conflict-
ing views of municipal governments as service providers versus as
key democratic institutions.6 Over time, democracy increased at
the local level, but no concept of home rule ever developed.
There have been several periods of reform since the Baldwin
Act. In the late nineteenth century, reformers successfully advo-
59. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3, § 92(8) (U.K), as reprinted in R.S.C.,
No. 5 (Appendix 1985). Also, matters of a "local or private nature" are assigned to the prov-
inces. See id. § 92(16).
60. See R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 SCR 674, 687.
61. East York v. Ontario, [1997] 34 O.R.3d 789, affd, [1998] 43 M.P.L.R.2d 155, leave
refused, [1998] 1 S.C.R. vii. Some provinces now recognize in their legislation the obligation
for the provincial government to consult with municipalities on any changes to their powers,
duties, other matters of mutual interest. See, e.g., Community Charter, S.B.C., ch. 26, § 276
(2003); Municipal Government Act, S.N.S., ch. 18, §§ 196, 519 (1998).
62. An Act to Provide, by one General Law, for the Erection of Municipal Corpora-
tions, and the Establishment of Regulations of Police, in and for the Several Counties,
Towns, Townships and Villages in Upper Canada, 1849 12 Victoria, ch. 81 (U.K.).
63. Engin F. Isin, The Origins of Canadian Municipal Government, in CANADIAN METRO-
POLITICS: GOVERNING OUR CITIES 63-64 (James Lightbody ed., 1995).
64. KATHERINE A. GRAHAM & SUSAN D. PHILLIPS, URBAN GOVERNANCE IN CANADA:
REPRESENTATION, RESOURCES, AND RESTRUCTURING 45 (1998).
65. Isin, supra note 63, at 75.
66. See generally C. RICHARD TINDAL & SUSAN NOBES TINDAL, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
CANADA 5-7 (5th ed. 2000).
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cated the removal of partisan politics from municipal government
as a way to eliminate the risk of corruption and achieve efficient
administration. Several "structural changes designed to reduce the
influence of the politician and to elevate the role of the appointed
expert" were made. 7 Following the Depression, the financial
autonomy of municipalities was significantly restricted. Structural
changes included the creation of regional governments in the
1950s and 1960s due to rapid urbanization,m and a series of con-
troversial forced amalgamations in the late 1990s that reduced the
number and increased the size of many municipalities. 69 All mu-
nicipal governments in Ontario are now classified as one of three
kinds: single-tier or, within a two-tier arrangement, upper or lower-
tier. Single-tier municipalities are usually, but not exclusively, the
larger cities, including Toronto, Ottawa, Hamilton, and London. A
two-tier arrangement is used for smaller towns within counties and
for cities and towns within regions. Following amalgamation, re-
gions are now mostly limited to parts of the "Greater Golden
Horseshoe" area around Toronto. 7
However, the first dramatic shift in legal status and powers came
only recently with adoption of the Municipal Act, 2001, which
came into force in 2003.71 For the first time, an Act recognized that
municipalities are created by the province to be responsible and
accountable governments. The approach of the Ontario Legislature
from the nineteenth century until enactment of the new statute
had been to confer limited authority on municipal governments,
usually through detailed statutory prescriptions in the Municipal
Act and in other pieces of legislation.2 Under the new Act, all mu-
nicipal governments are, for the first time, given "natural person"
powers and broad grants of regulatory authority.7 3 The broadest
powers, intended to be exclusive to local governments, are known
67. See id. at 10. Appointed boards removed control over planning, policing, public
health, children's services, and public transit from elected councils. Id.
68. Metropolitan Toronto was created in 1953, followed by the creation of twelve other
regional governments between 1969 and 1974. See id. at 99, 106.
69. Andrew Sancton, Why Municipal Amalgamations? Halifax, Toronto, Montrea in CAN-
ADA: THE STATE OF THE FEDERATION 2004: MUNICIPAL-FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS IN
CANADA 119 (Young & Leuprecht eds., 2006).
70. See Growth Plan Areas, O.Reg. 416/05; see also ONTARIO MINISTRY OF MUNICIPAL
AFFAIRS AND HOUSING, ONTARIO MUNICIPALITIES, http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/userfiles/
page-attachments/Library/1/3858872_List of OntarioMunicipalities.Mar06.2006.pdf
(providing a list of Ontario Municipalities with their tier levels).
71. Municipal Act, 2001 S.O., ch. 25 (Can.).
72 Compare Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45 with Municipal Act, 2001.
73. Id. § 8.
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as "spheres of jurisdiction."7 4 "Specific powers" are those in areas
that overlap with areas of provincial regulation and thus are more
carefully tailored.75
In addition to narrow grants of authority in the earlier legisla-
tion, Canadian courts followed "Dillon's Rule" when interpreting
the limits of municipal authority. 6 This rule provides that a mu-
nicipality may exercise "only those powers expressly conferred by
statute, those powers necessarily or fairly implied by the expressed
power in the statute, and those powers essential to, and not merely
convenient for, the effectuation of the purposes of the corpora-
tion."77 An interventionist role for the courts was justified
historically because of the origins of municipal decision-making in
the hands of non-elected officials and because of concerns about
incompetence, conflicts of interest, and corruption.7 s Even what
appeared to be broad grants of power (e.g., general welfare pow-
ers, discussed below) were interpreted so narrowly as to render
them meaningless. 79 This was a very different approach from that
taken with other statutory bodies created by the province, which
were entitled to considerable deference when acting within their
jurisdiction.8 0
The result of narrow legislative grants plus the application of
Dillon's Rule by the courts was that municipal powers were strictly
construed and local governments had little flexibility to meet new
challenges. Each time new issues arose, municipalities would have
to petition the Legislature to add new powers to the legislation.'
The decisions of local councils were entitled to no deference.82 It
was only in the 1990s that this situation began to change in the
courts, at the same time that new legislation was being developed.
3
In the courts, a new approach began to crystallize around a
strong dissent from Justice McLachlin in the 1994 Supreme Court
of Canada decision on municipal powers, Shell Canada Products Ltd.
v. Vancouver.4 In that case, Justice McLachlin said:
74. Id.§ 11.
75. Id. §§ 24-149.
76. STANLEY M. MAKUCH, NEIL CRAIK & SIGNE B. LEISK, CANADIAN MUNICIPAL AND
PLANNING LAw 82 (2004).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 83.
80. Marcia Valiante, Turf War: Municipal Powers, the Regulation of Pesticides and the Hud-
son Decision, 11J. ENVTL. L. & PRAc. 327, 333 (2001).
81. MAKUCH ET AL., supra note 76, at 88-89.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 90-93.
84. Shell Canada Prod. Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] S.C.R. 231, 244, 248 (McLach-
lin,J., dissenting).
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Barring clear demonstration that a municipal decision was
beyond its powers, courts should not so hold. In cases where
powers are not expressly conferred but may be implied, courts
must be prepared to adopt the "benevolent construction" ...
and confer the powers by reasonable implication.... I find it
sufficient to suggest thatjudicial review of municipal decisions
should be confined to clear cases. The elected members of
council are discharging a statutory duty. The right to exercise
that duty freely and in accordance with the perceived wishes
of the people they represent is vital to local democracy. 5
This view has since been adopted as the Court's prevailing view
86
of municipal powers. In addition, the courts have been called on
to interpret the new municipal legislation. In the leading Supreme
Court of Canada decision reviewing the new powers, United Taxi
Drivers' Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary, Justice Bastarache
said:
The evolution of the modern municipality has produced a
shift in the proper approach to the interpretation of statutes
empowering municipalities . .. . The 'benevolent' and "strict"
construction dichotomy has been set aside, and a broad and
purposive approach to the interpretation of municipal powers
has been embraced ... This interpretive approach has
evolved concomitantly with the modern method of drafting
municipal legislation .... This shift in legislative drafting re-
flects the true nature of modern municipalities which require
greater flexibility in fulfilling their statutory purposes.87
With respect to the new Ontario legislation, the Ontario Court
of Appeal's view is that:
... absent an express direction to the contrary in the Munici-
pal Act, 2001, which is not there, the jurisprudence from the
Supreme Court is clear that municipal powers, including gen-
eral welfare powers, are to be interpreted broadly and
generously within their context and statutory limits, to achieve
85. Id.
86. MAKUCH ET AL., supra note 76, at 9 0 - 9 3 .
87. United Taxi Drivers' Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City), [2004] 1
S.C.R. 493.
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the legitimate interests of the municipality and its inhabi-
tants."8
In addition to construing municipal powers more broadly, Ca-
nadian courts have also taken an ever-narrower view of what
constitutes a conflict between municipal bylaws and federal or pro-
vincial laws.8 9 The effect is to reduce the likelihood of there being a
conflict in areas of overlapping regulation, thereby supporting a
wider range of municipal actions.
1. Specific Powers with Respect to the Environment
For many years, local governments in Ontario have had specific
powers to regulate aspects of environmental protection. For exam-
ple, municipalities had the power to pass bylaws to establish,
operate, and maintain sewers, drains, sewage works, water systems,
waste collection and management systems; to address flood con-
trol; to control nuisances; to regulate the discharge of substances
to sewers; and to regulate site alteration and placing of fill under
the Municipal Act.90 Broad powers to regulate the subdivision of
land and the siting, density, and use of buildings were also dele-
gated to municipalities under the Planning Act.9'
Under the old municipal legislation, local governments also had
what appeared on its face to be residual authority to adopt bylaws
to protect the general health and welfare of their inhabitants. Yet,
for many years, courts read this power so narrowly that it was
stripped of meaning.93 Then, in 2001, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada upheld a municipal ban on the cosmetic use of pesticides
under a similar provision found in the Quebec municipal legisla-
tion, the Cities and Towns Act.94 This led to a flurry of similar
88. Croplife Canada v Toronto (City), [2005] 75 O.R.3d 373.
89. See 114957 Canada Lt6e v. Hudson, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241. The test for conflicts with
either federal or provincial legislation is now "first, that they both deal with similar subject
matters and second, that obeying one necessarily means disobeying the other." Id. at 271.
90. See Municipal Act, R.S.O., ch. M.45 (1990).
91. Planning Act, R.S.O., ch. P.13 (1990).
92. Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, § 102.
93. See Morrison v. Kingston (City), [1937] 4 D.L.R. 740.
94. 114957 Canada Lt~e v. Hudson, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241. The Court rejected this tradi-
tional interpretation, adopting the view that grants of general welfare authority must be
given some meaning:
It reflects the reality that the legislature and its drafters cannot foresee every particu-
lar situation. It appears to be sound legislative and administrative policy, under such
provisions, to grant local governments a residual authority to deal with the unfore-
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bylaws across Qu6bec and in other provinces, including Ontario.
The Toronto bylaw was enacted under the new Municipal Act,
2001, which was intended to give municipal governments broader
powers to address areas of local concern.9 The power to act "for
purposes related to the health, safety and well-being" of local in-
habitants was limited to a "specific power," rather than a broad
"sphere of jurisdiction," that is, a more narrow power.96 Even so,
the Ontario Court of Appeal threw out the old jurisprudence and
upheld the pesticide bylaw, refusing also to find any conflict with
federal or provincial pesticide legislation.97 This decision suggests
acceptance of a more expansive power in local governments to ad-
dress issues that might affect community health and well-being,
including environmental protection.
The Municipal Act, 2001 included environmental protection in
the category of a "specific power" to reflect the province's signifi-
cant role and minimize potential overlap. 8 Recent changes to the
powers of the City of Toronto," which the province has extended
to other municipalities, '00 will change the categorization of powers
with respect to "[e]conomic, social and environmental well-being"
and "[h]ealth, safety and well-being of persons" from specific to
"general powers."'0 ' This change means that municipal regulation
of environmental and health protection will be subject only to
specified limitations, which is deliberately intended to expand the
flexibility that municipalities will have in legislating to achieve
these objectives. How far municipalities will be able to go remains
to be seen, as environmental authority will continue to be shared
with the province, and local bylaws cannot conflict with provincial
laws.10 2 The amendments also allow the provincial cabinet to rein in
municipal regulation temporarily if it considers it "necessary or
desirable in the provincial interest.',
0 3
seen or changing circumstances, and to address emerging or changing issues con-
cerning the welfare of the local community...
Id. at 278 (LeBel,J., concurring).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
96. Municipal Act, 2001 S.O., § 130.
97. Croplife Canada v. Toronto (City), [2005] 75 O.R. 3d 373.
98. JOHN MASCARIN & CHRISTOPHER J. WILLIAMS, ONTARIO MUNICIPAL ACT AND
COMMENTARY 16 (2005).
99. SeeCity of Toronto Act, 2006 S.O., ch. 11 (Can.).
100. An Act to Amend Various Acts in Relation to Municipalities, S.O. 2006, c. 32.
101. Id. § 10(2)(5)-(6).
102. See MASCARIN, supra note 98.
103. See An Act to Amend Various Acts in Relation to Municipalities, supra note 100, at
§ 451.1.
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With respect to protection of water quality, the province has im-
posed strict province-wide standards for drinking water, following
the recommendations of the Walkerton Inquiry.0 4 New legislation
on source water protection, known as the Clean Water Act, will re-
quire watershed-based plans to protect sources of drinking water.
Municipalities, along with other local interests, will participate on
the committees that develop the plans, but it will be municipalities
that will be responsible both for implementing the plans through
official plans and zoning bylaws and for enforcement.
0 6
On planning issues, the trend is not toward more local auton-
omy but toward increased provincial control over development in
order to accommodate growth while attempting to stem the phe-
nomenon of sprawl. For all areas of the province, local and
regional planning decisions must now be consistent with policies
that, inter alia, promote intensification and brownfield redevelop-
ment, link planning for infrastructure and growth, and ensure
adoption of storm water management practices that minimize run-
off and contaminant loads and increase vegetative and pervious
surfaces.' 7 Within the large region around Toronto, the province
has legislated to allow for the development and implementation of
a "growth management plan" and a greenbelt.0 s The Growth Plan
for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, finalized in June of 2006, iden-
tifies policies that advance compact, mixed use and transit-
supportive development within designated settlement area, estab-
lishes targets for intensification, and adopts policies for the
protection of prime agricultural land and natural systems outside
settlement area boundaries.'09 Municipalities within the region will
be required to amend their official plans to bring them into con-
formity with the plan." ° The Greenbelt Plan restricts development
in designated rural and agricultural areas and in areas with signifi-
104. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002 S.O., ch. 32 (Can.). Ontario established a
public inquiry following the fatal outbreak of disease from contaminated municipal drink-
ing water in the Town of Walkerton in 2000. See O'CONNOR, supra note 12, at 2. New
legislation, the Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002, and numerous regulations were adopted to
deal with standards for drinking water quality, management of municipal drinking water
systems, training of water utility operators, licensing of laboratories, etc. Id.
105. Clean Water Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 22.
106. Id. § 39, 47.
107. ONTARIO MINISTRY OF MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS AND HOUSING, PROVINCIAL POLICY
STATEMENT 4, 5, 10, 16 (2005) (adopted by Order in Council 140/2005), available at
http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/userfiles/page-attachments/Library/l/789108-ppsenglish.pdf.
108. See Places to Grow Act, 2005 S.O., ch. 13 (Can.); Greenbelt Act, 2005 S.O., ch. 1
(Can.).
109. See generally MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE RENEWVAL, supra note 43.
110. Places to Grow Act, 2005 S.O., § 12.
1072 [VOL. 40:4
Great Lakes Environmental Governance
cant ecological and hydrological functions.' Again, all municipali-cantecolgica  hydologcal1112
ties within the coverage area'1 must bring their official plans into
conformity, but they are free to adopt policies that are more strin-
gent than the provincial policies."3
2. Specific Powers with Respect to Intergovernmental
and International Relations
In Canada, international relations, in the sense of formal diFlo-
macy and treaty making, are primarily a matter for the federal
government. 1 4 However, the incorporation of treaty obligations
into domestic law requires legislative action by the level of gov-
ernment with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the treaty.115
This requirement means that a treaty signed by the federal gov-
ernment may have to rely on provincial governments to bring the
treaty into legal effect. To the extent that municipalities exercise
power delegated by provincial governments, they may have a lim-
ited role to play in treaty implementation. On the flip side, even
though municipalities are invisible in international law, if they act
in a way that is inconsistent with Canada's international obliga-
tions, Canada could be liable to claims."1
6
But this is by no means the end of the story. Canadian provinces
are very active internationally. They have entered into numerous
agreements with states in the United States and participate in many
regional, transboundary organizauons. Municipalities, too, are
active internationally. Although they cannot enter into treaties,
111. GREENBELT PLAN 2005 14, 17 (2005) (adopted by Order in Council 208/2005),
http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/userfies/page-attachments/Library/1/1701401-greenbelt-pla
n_final.pdf.
112. The Greenbelt Plan covers a smaller region than the Growth Plan. It links up rural
areas within the region with already protected lands along the Niagara Escarpment and the
Oak Ridges Moraine. Id. at 1.
113. Id.at42.
114. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3, § 132 (U.K), as reprinted in R.S.C., No.
5 (Appendix 1985). Constitution Act 1867, § 132.
115. A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont. (Labour Conventions), [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
116. See Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 URB.
LAW. 1, 13-14 (2006) (discussing several cases of trade and investment disputes originating
in the actions of local governments).
117. See generally COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, GREAT LAKES CHARTER
(1985), http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/greatlakescharter.pdf; GREAT LAKES-
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they do have authority to enter into agreements with other gov-
ernments in areas of municipal authority.'
18
Many Canadian municipalities individually participate in inter-
national organizations, such as ICLEI," 9 or have taken action to
implement international norms, including human rights conven-
tions and climate change targets. 20 As well, more than 1000
municipalities representing eighty percent of the Canadian popu-
lation are members of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities
121(FCM), a national umbrella group. Ontario municipalities are
also members of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario
(AMO). Both groups represent the interests of local governments
in negotiations and partnership arrangements with senior levels of
government and with their counterparts internationally. 122 FCM has
a Standing Committee on International Relations, 123 has adopted
many resolutions on international issues, and has established an
International Center for Municipal Development and a Municipal
Partnership Program to share expertise and experience with mu-
nicipalities in developing countries.' 2" FCM also has an ongoing
collaborative relationship with the U.S. Conference of Mayors and
the National League of Cities. 25 Larger cities are linked through
networks of professional staff on a wide range of issues. 12 6 Local
118. Municipal Act, 2001 S.O., ch. 25, §§ 20-23.
119. See generally ICLEI: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSATAINABILITY, http://
www.iclei.org. ICLEI has nineteen Canadian members, many of which are in the Great Lakes
Basin. Through ICLEI, these municipalities pursue sustainability management and partici-
pate in climate change initiatives and the North American Green Purchasing Initiative, a
government procurement program that supports environmentally friendly production. Id.
120. For example, the City of Toronto established the "Toronto Atmospheric Fund" to
provide limited financing of initiatives that combat climate change and improve air quality.
CITY OF TORONTO, TORONTO ATMOSPHERIC FUND, http://www.toronto.ca/taf/index.htm.
Funded projects and educational efforts have related to energy conservation, alternative
energy, car sharing, green roofs, and green tourism. Id. For a number of examples from the
United States, see Shanna Singh, Note, Brandeis's Happy Incident Revisited: U.S. Cities as the
New Laboratories of International Law, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 537 (2005). For a discus-
sion of the different roles that local governments play internationally, see Yishai Blank, The
City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 875 (2006); Yishai Blank, Localism in the New
Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT'L LJ. 263 (2006).
121. SeeABOUT FCM, http://www.fcm.ca/english/about/about.html.
122. See MARY LOUISE MCALLISTER, GOVERNING OuRsELVES? THE POLITICS OF CANA-
DIAN COMMUNITIES 124-25 (2004) (discussing FCM and provincial associations, of which
AMO is one).
123. FCM, STANDING COMMITTEES, www.fcm.ca/english/policy/internationalsc.html.
124. FCM, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT, www.international.
fcm.ca.
125. FCM, POLICY DEVELOPMENT BOOK 30 (2006), www.fcm.ca/english/policy/
pdb.pdf.
126. See CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATORS, www.camacam.ca.
1074 [VOL. 40:4
Great Lakes Environmental Governance
governments in the Great Lakes region participate in the Great
Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.
2 7
B. Financial Powers of Canadian Municipal Governments
Despite growing legal authority and experience in environ-
mental policy development and implementation, Canadian
municipal governments are not financially self-sufficient. Because
of their lack of independent constitutional status, municipalities
depend on the province to delegate the power to raise funds for
their activities.12 ' By statute, Ontario limits municipal governments
to raising money through property taxes and development
charges, l2 and through licensing and user fees.'30 Municipal gov-
ernments cannot budget for a deficit in annual operating
expenses, 1 so they must raise all the funds required to pay their
obligations each year. The province also places restrictions on capi-
tal borrowing.1 3 2 Debt limits are set out in regulations.
3 3
Municipal sources of revenue tend to grow more slowly than in-
come or economic activity, and there is significant political
pressure not to increase these sources, but at the same time, ex-
penses have grown. "As cities grow, new infrastructure demands
and quality service expectations force municipalities to make capi-
tal and operating expenditures without capturing an equitable
share of the tax revenue benefits that accompany such growth:
those benefits are retained by the provincial/territorial and federal
governments." 34 For example, from 1999 to 2003, federal and pro-
vincial revenues grew by twelve percent and thirteen percent
127. See GREAT LAKES AND ST. LAWRENCE CITIES INITIATIVE, www.glslcities.org.
128. Id. at 20-21. Under the Canadian Constitution, provinces themselves are limited to
raising revenues by way of "direct" taxation, and thus can only delegate to the extent of this
power. Ontario Home Builders' Ass'n v. York Bd. of Educ., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 929.
129. See Development Charges Act, 1997 S.O., ch. 27 (Can.). Development charges are
fees local governments are entitled to collect from the developers to pay for the capital costs
of certain new services and facilities necessitated by new development. The fees are then
passed on to the new owners. Id.; see also, Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, §§ 306-26
(provisions related to municipal taxation).
130. See Ontario Private Campground Ass'n v. Harvey, [1997] 39 M.P.L.R.3d 1. User fees
are limited to the amount necessary to defray the costs of the program and are not used to
raise revenue. Otherwise, the fees would be considered a tax and would be ultra vires. Id.; see
also, Municipal Act, 2001, §§ 390-400 (provisions related to fees and charges).
131. See Municipal Act, 2001 S.O., ch. 25, § 407(1).
132. Id.
133. See Debt and Financial Obligation Limits Regulation, O.Reg. 403/02 (Can.).
134. BIG CITY MAYORS' CAUCUS, supra note 41, at 9.
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respectively, but municipal revenues grew by only eight percent.15
The gap is made up by conditional and unconditional grants and
transfers from other levels of government, primarily from the pro-
vincial government.36
During the 1990s, a Conservative government was elected in On-
tario on a platform known as the "Common Sense Revolution."'
v3
One priority of the new government was the rationalization of ser-
vices as between the province and municipalities. 38 Responsibilities
for some services were shifted, accompanied by changes in the fi-
nancing of those services. Most importantly, education financing
from residential property taxes raised by local school boards was
reduced and replaced with a combination of provincial transfers
and property taxes. 39 In turn, municipalities were given responsi-
bility for social assistance, emergency services, and infrastructure,
so they could raise property taxes and the province could reduce
transfers for these purposes, without the local residential ratepay-
ers seeing any difference in their local tax bill. 40 The result has
been a significant reduction in provincial transfers to municipali-
ties, and even greater reliance by local governments on property
taxes and user fees for their revenues, from sixty-eight percent to
seventy-six percent.' 4' Heavy reliance on the property tax and the
particular system used in Ontario for assessing value and levying
property taxes means "an increase in a municipality's spending has
an overt and immediate impact on the individual taxpayer.' 4' This
heightens political sensitivity to any increase in spending and re-
sults in strong pressure to reduce or freeze tax rates. The effect is
to push local politicians toward increasing the assessment base to
increase their revenues, which motivates their "support [for] plan-
ning decisions that have a positive effect on the overall balance of
135. FEDERATION OF CANADA MUNICIPALITIES, POLICY STATEMENT ON MUNICIPAL FI-
NANCE AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS 2006-2007, http://www.fcm.ca/english/
policy/munfin.html.
136. Id. at 5.
137. David Siegel, Recent Changes in Provincial-Municipal Relations in Ontario: A New Era or
a Missed Opportunity?, in CANADA: THE STATE OF THE FEDERATION 2004: MUNICIPAL-
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA, supra note 69, at 181-97.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Melville L. McMillan, Municipal Relations with the Federal and Provincial Governments:
A Fiscal Perspective, in CANADA: THE STATE OF THE FEDERATION 2004: MUNICIPAL-FEDERAL-
PROVINCIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA, supra note 69, at 54-55.
141. Id.
142. MAKUCH, supra note 76, at 35. Under the current Part IX of the Municipal Act,
2001, tax increases for commercial, industrial, and multi-residential properties are capped,
so any significant increase in local spending would have to come from increases in rates paid
by single-family residential taxpayers. Municipal Act, R.S.O., ch. 25, §§ 327-38 (2001)
(Can.).
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assessment.' 43 Another result has been a neglect of funding for the
maintenance of infrastructure, the result of chronic under-
investment by all levels of government.
44
As a result of rapid growth and greater responsibilities without
greater fiscal authority, Canadian municipalities are facing a situa-
tion of "fiscal unsustainability.'' 45 This
has at least two significant negative consequences for main-
taining urban place quality. First, it has led to a sizable
"municipal infrastructure deficit," as needed capital invest-
ments in transit, roads, telecommunications networks, and the
like are postponed or delayed, hindering cities in their efforts
to meet the competitiveness challenges of globalization ....
Second, it creates incentives to ecologically harmful sprawl.
46
Expenditures by local governments are limited to spending for
"municipal purposes.' 4 7 Spending associated with specific powers
would clearly qualify. There are some restrictions, including a re-
striction that a municipality cannot directly or indirectly assist a
business through the granting of "bonuses," such as giving or lend-
ing money, guaranteeing borrowing, leasing or selling municipal
property at below market value, or giving a total or partial exemp-
tion from levies or fees, to induce the business to locate or
undertake certain kinds of development. 148 However, some limited
exceptions are allowed, for example, if a development will involve
either restoration of a heritage property or redevelopment of a
brownfield site. 49 Although not formally recognized in the Ontario
legislation, some municipalities have set up programs that provide
143. MAKUCH, supra note 76, at 35. This political resistance to spending has spilled over
into resistance to capital borrowing by Ontario municipalities, so that their indebtedness is
well below the provincial limits. See Enid Slack, The Road to Financial Self-Sufficiency for Toronto:
What are the Impediments and How Can They be Overcome?, in TORONTO: CONSIDERING SELF
GOVERNMENT, supra note 58, at 62.
144. EXTERNAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITIES AND COMMUNITIES, SUpra note 33, at
25-26.
145. NEIL BRADFORD, WHY CITIES MATTER: POLICY RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES FOR CAN-
ADA 11 (2002).
146. Id.
147. Municipal Act, 2001 S.O., ch. 25, § 407(2).
148. ld. at §106.
149. See Ontario Heritage Act, R.S.O., ch. 0.18, § 39 (1990); Planning Act, R.S.O., ch.
P.13, § 28. Municipalities are also allowed to cancel, reduce or refund property taxes for
land being rehabilitated or for heritage properties being renovated, but not for any other
purpose. See Municipal Act, 2001 S.O., ch. 25, § 106.
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tax increment equivalent grants to provide an incentive for brown-
field redevelopment.
150
Fees and charges are another source of revenue for municipali-
ties. These sources also have the potential to influence behavior
toward greater conservation, however, as the regulations restrict
the amount of such charges to the cost of providing a service or
system. 5' For waste, water, and sewage, charges have not been set at
rates that covered the full operating, capital, and replacement
costs, contributing to their underfunding. 52 New legislation that
has been adopted, but is not yet in force, will allow municipalities
to recover the full costs of providing such services, including costs
for source water protection, operation, financing, renewal, and
improvements, from those using the systems.
5 3
C. Political Influence of Canadian Municipal Governments
In the last few years, there has been a major shift in the political
importance of urban issues and the influence of local govern-
ments, particularly of Canada's large cities. Throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the dominant public policy
discourses treated the national level as the important scale of po-
litical relevance, resulting in a "systematic downplaying of the




Nearly eighty percent of Canadians now live in urban areas, and
these areas are growing."5' The responsibilities of municipal gov-
ernments have changed dramatically:
When the Baldwin Act was enacted, the principal local gov-
ernment issues were drunkenness and profanity, the running
of cattle or poultry in public places, itinerant salesmen, the
repair and maintenance of local roads, and the prevention or
abatement of charivaries, noises and nuisances. Today, mu-
nicipalities own and operate hospitals, welfare systems, waste
150. See ONTARIO MINISTRY OF MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS AND HOUSING, MUNICIPAL FINAN-
CIAL TOOLS FOR PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 9-11 (2000), http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/
userfiles/page-attachments/Library/1/2566879financialtools e.pdf.
151. Fees and Charges Regulation, O.Reg. 244/02 (Can.).
152. EXTERNAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITIES AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 33, at
25-26.
153. See Sustainable Water and Sewage Systems Act, 2002 S.O., ch. 29 (Can.).
154. BRADFORD, supra note 145, at 14.
155. EXTERNAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CITIES AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 33, at
2. There is a flow of people from rural to urban areas and from urban to ex-urban areas, but
most urban growth is due to immigration from outside Canada. Id. at 5. Almost ninety-four
percent of recent immigrants live in large urban areas. Id.
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treatment plants, airports, public housing, hydroelectric
plants, telecommunication systems, forensic laboratories,
AIDS hospices, homeless shelters, hot lunch programs for
school children, economic development, toxic waste remedia-
tion and fiber optic transmission. These duties and
responsibilities are evolving in the face of legislation and
structures that have not varied from a model anchored to the
needs of the mid-1800's.
15 6
Also, the responsibilities of all levels of government overlap.
Under the Canadian federal system, the federal government can-
not interfere with municipal institutions or influence local
governments directly, other than through its "spending power." 57
However, because of the structure of Canadian society, numerous
federal programs touch on urban issues and affect local communi-
ties.
Senior governments have come to recognize that cities are the
"engines of the economy" in a globalized world and that Canada's
ability to compete internationally depends on very localized "qual-
ity of place" factors such as availability of skilled labor,
infrastructure, cultural resources, educational, health and social
services, security, and environmental quality.' 8 The performance of
urban areas is of increasing significance to the federal government
in particular. A new arrangement with local governments is sup-
ported by the work of a number of think tanks and influential
scholars.' 59
156. DONALD LIDSTONE, A COMPARISON OF NEW AND PROPOSED MUNICIPAL ACTS OF
THE PROVINCES: REVENUES, FINANCIAL POWERS AND RESOURCES 1-2 (2001), http://
www.canadascities.ca/pdf/donald-lidstone.pdf"
157. Loleen Berdahl, The Federal Urban Role and Federal-Municipal Relations, in CANADA:
THE STATE OF THE FEDERATION 2004: MUNICIPAL-FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS IN CAN-
ADA, supra note 69, at 27-30.
158. For example, growth rates for employment are highest in the country's biggest cit-
ies. From 2001 to 2004, more than seventy percent of all new jobs in Canada were created
within ten large metropolitan areas. FEDERATION OF CANADIAN MUNICIPALITIES, BUILDING
PROSPERITY FROM THE GROUND UP: RESTORING MUNICIPAL FISCAL BALANCE 12 (2006),
http://www.fcm.ca/English/media/backgrounders/fiscalim.pdf. Three cities alone ac-
counted for nearly half of all employment growth in the country: Vancouver, Toronto, and
Montreal. Id. Competitiveness depends on the existence of geographically based clusters
that attract talent and "accelerate the pace of innovation, attract investment, stimulate job
creation and generate wealth." Id.
159. See Robert Young & Christian Leuprecht, Introduction: New Work, Background Themes,
and Future Research about Municipal-Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada, in CANADA: THE
STATE OF THE FEDERATION 2004: MUNICIPAL-FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA,
supra note 69, at 14.
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Under the Liberal governments of Prime Ministers Jean Chre-
tien and Paul Martin, several initiatives were launched that
together comprise a "New Deal for Cities and Communities. ''"o
Most of the focus of the New Deal has been on providing ex-
panded funding for infrastructure.' As part of the New Deal, the
federal government has entered into agreements to share revenue
from the federal gasoline tax with municipalities, in Ontario pro-
viding $1865.5 million in new funds to local governments over five
years, conditional on the money being used for investment in "en-
vironmentally sustainable municipal infrastructure." 6" The federal
government has also agreed to a 100% rebate of Goods and Ser-
vices Tax payments by municipal governments, the equivalent of $7
billion over ten years. 16' A new federal department was established
that now provides grants directed toward local investment in infra-
structure development and renewal. 64 The Ontario government
has also added a new ministry, agencies, and programs to address
the infrastructure deficit.' 65
Aside from the new grants, most of which are conditional, the
provincial government has not moved to change the taxing power
160. CANADA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, A NEW DEAL FOR CANADA'S COMMUNITIES,
www.fin.gc.ca/budget05/pamph/pacome.htm.
161. CANADA ET AL., AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER OF FEDERAL GAS TAX REVENUES
UNDER THE NEW DEAL FOR CITIES AND COMMUNITIES 7 (2005), http://
www.infrastructure.gc.ca/communities-collectivites/alt tformats/pdf/gt_canone.pdf. To
qualify for funding, investments must meet one of the objectives of reduced greenhouse gas
emission, cleaner water or cleaner air. Id.
162. Id.
163. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, BUDGET 2005: A NEW DEAL FOR CANADA'S COMMUNI-
TIES, http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget05/pdf/pacome.pdf.
164. The new department is known as Infrastructure Canada and includes a Cities and
Communities Branch. Funding for infrastructure comes from several programs: the Canada
Strategic Infrastructure Fund ($6 billion), the Border Infrastructure Fund ($600 million),
the Municipal Rural Infrastructure Program ($3.2 billion), and the Infrastructure Canada
Program ($2.05 billion), which includes funding for "green" municipal infrastructure. IN-
FRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMS, http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/ip-pi/index_e.shtml.
165. The new ministry is known as the Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal. See
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE RENEWAL, http://www.pir.gov.on.ca/english/
infrastructure/index.html. Also, a Crown corporation known as Infrastructure Ontario was
established in November 2005 to manage infrastructure projects using alternative financing
methods. See INFRASTRUCTURE ONTARIO, ABouT US, http://www.infrastructureontario.ca/
en/about/index.asp. In May 2005, a new program, ReNew Ontario, was set up to provide
$30 billion to municipalities over five years in order to repair the "neglect of the past" and
build for future growth. See RENEW ONTARIO, THE CHALLENGE, http://www.pir.gov.on.ca/
english/infrastructure/solutions.htm. Ontario also contributes to federal-provincial pro-
grams, including the Canada-Ontario Municipal Rural Infrastructure Fund for small and
medium sized municipalities and the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund. See CANADA-
ONTARIO MUNICIPAL RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE FUND, INFRASTRUCTURE, http://
www.comrif.ca/eng/default.asp.
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of municipal governments in any significant way. 66 The Liberal
government elected in late 2004 has commenced a review of the
provincial-municipal relationship that will include a review of fund-
ing, service delivery, and service governance, expected to be
complete in 2008.167 In the meantime, the proposed changes to the
City of Toronto Act and the Municipal Act, 2001, discussed above,
add only incrementally to the ability of local governments to raise
revenue from new sources. These powers are still quite limited
compared to the powers of municipalities in other countries.
168
This is likely to mean that even with expanded legal powers, the
practical reality for many municipal governments in the short term
will be a continuation of the status quo.69
D. Summary
Canadian municipalities are demanding respect and a new po-
litical role that requires collaboration, partnership, networking,
consultation, "place based policy" in substance, and financial
autonomy. Local governments are gaining powers to make and im-
plement environmental policy, increased financial autonomy as a
result of strong political influence at the national and provincial
levels, and experience with international partners. More could be
done to secure their autonomy, but even now, these changes sug-
gest that local governments are well positioned to play an
expanded role in Great Lakes policy formation and implementa-
tion.
Nevertheless, local governments in Ontario remain "creatures of
the province,' 7 ° subject to changes in their structure, powers, and
responsibilities imposed from outside. The trend has been for the
province to increase the size of municipalities through
amalgamation-even against the will of residents-in an effort to
achieve greater efficiency, and to add both new powers and new
166. MASCARIN & WILLIAMS, supra note 98, at 50. The Ontario government has adopted
several new regulations to provide more flexibility to municipalities in terms of eligible in-
vestments. See O.Regs. 651/05-655/05.
167. See ONTARIO MINISTRY OF MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS AND HOUSING, PROVINCIAL-
MUNICIPAL FISCAL AND SERVICE DELIVERY REVIEW: ENHANCING THE PROVINCIAL-MUNICIPAL
PARTNERSHIP, http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/userfiles/HTML/nts__27603_1 .html.
168. MAKUCH ET AL., supra note 76, at 79 (discussing the U.S. "home rule").
169. See Siegel, supra note 138, at 194-95. The focus of many municipalities and their
associations has been on the financial issues, the so-called "fiscal imbalance," rather than on
their expanding authority. The persistence of subordinate behavior by municipalities and
paternalistic behavior by the province appears not to have changed yet. Id.
170. R.v. Greenbaum, (1993), 14 M.P.L.R.2d 12.
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responsibilities. Even in the new municipal legislation, which
expands local powers, the province retains residual authority to
check the actions of local governments if provincial interests are at
stake. In addition, decentralization of authority to local governments
has been matched by greater centralization on the specific issue of
growth management. And, there is still a reluctance to make major
adjustments to the revenue-raising abilities of local governments.
III. CHALLENGES TO EXPANDED INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN GREAT LAKES POLICY MAKING
Expanding the role of local governments in Great Lakes policy-
making would require tackling a number of challenging issues.
These include issues of scale, fragmentation, resources, and com-
mitment.
Some problems affecting Great Lakes water quality are un-
doubtedly local, but many transcend the local to affect a region or
beyond. While individual local governments play a leading role in
the former, they lack the authority to address region-wide problems
in any comprehensive way, despite having an interest in and influ-
ence over what happens at that level. Thus, a challenge for an
expanded local government role is what system and structures can
be put in place to address region-wide problems. Ontario already
uses a number of regional scale structures to address this chal-
lenge. For example, two-tier governments allow for the scaling up
of issues affecting a number of local governments, including trans-
portation and waste management." ' For broader scale concerns,
the province has established inter-municipal special purpose agen-
cies, such as the Greater Toronto Transportation Agency."' There
is also a long history of municipal involvement in watershed-based
Conservation Authorities that could form the framework for this
level of water quality policy-making. Common policies for water-
sheds are developed at this level and implemented through local
planning decisions.' A similar structure will be used to protect
drinking water sources: watershed-based source water protection
committees will be required to address impacts on the Great Lakes
in their assessments and plans, and local municipalities will be re-
171. Municipal Act 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, § 11.
172. Greater Toronto Transportation Authority Act, S.O. 2006, ch. 16. This new agency
was established earlier this year to address transportation planning and coordination in the
Greater Toronto and Hamilton area. Id.
173. CONSERVATION AUTHORITIES OF ONTARIO: MANDATE, www.conservation-
ontario.on.ca/about/Mandate.html.
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quired to implement Great Lakes policies in their planning in-
struments and decisions. This system would serve as a useful model
for a structure to coordinate multi-level involvement in Great
Lakes protection.
One of the risks of scaling down policy-making to the local level
is that the cumulative effect of the policies that are adopted might
not support the vision adopted at the binational level. The point of
including more local involvement is to ensure that local govern-
ments recognize that their actions can undermine these larger
objectives and to get them to take responsibility for change, while
at the same time allowing innovative, community-based solutions to
come forward. Thus, an important challenge is how to link local
efforts into the larger enterprise of protection of Great Lakes water
quality so that all participants accept the goal and work toward it in
a coordinated way. Rather than simply shift to a "bottom-up" ap-
proach, Great Lakes governance must become "multi-level" to
become more effective. Coordination could be enhanced by in-
cluding municipal representatives in the policy-making
negotiations, most easily through the inclusion of municipal asso-
ciations such as AMO, FCM, and the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
Cities Initiative. In Ontario, coordination in the implementation of
provincial policies is already done through legislated requirements
for conformity between provincial and local policies and actions,
through provincial standards, and through provincial approval
mechanisms. 74 Intergovernmental agreements and partnerships,
such as COA, are commonly used in Canada and could be a vehicle
for effective coordination if municipal governments are included.
There is great variability between Ontario municipalities in
terms of their size, the nature of their economic base, development
pressure, social structures, and environmental problems. There is
also variability in local government capacity to play a meaningful
role in policy development and implementation, in terms of access
to funds, expertise, research, training, monitoring, and analysis.
Associations, such as AMO and FCM, play an important role in
providing their members with access to information and training,
and communications technology allows for the rapid spread of
ideas and experience from all around the world. However, senior
levels of government are still required to help out with the re-
source deficit, especially that of smaller municipalities. There has
been a pointed shift in senior level government officials' support
for infrastructure, but this support is too narrow. Until municipali-
174. See supra text accompanying notes 84-96.
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ties gain greater fiscal autonomy, resource constraints will hamper
their active participation in Great Lakes environmental protection.
One of the most difficult challenges is the variability between lo-
cal governments in their commitment to action on Great Lakes
clean-up. Some municipalities have been able to advance environ-
mental protection significantly even with limited powers and
limited access to funding, while others have not bothered to do
more than the minimum required by senior levels of government.
Scholars are divided on the potential of local governments to pro-
vide a forum for social movements, innovative policies, and new
relationships in the wake of economic globalization. 75 What is clear
is that local politics in many places continues to be dominated by
traditional economic and property interests, so that while innova-
tions are possible, there is often resistance. I76 Overcoming that
resistance depends on motivated leaders both in and out of gov-
ernment, who are able to demonstrate political courage and
inspire visionary thinking. Networking with other municipalities
and civil society groups and strong support from senior govern-
ments can help to inspire change and deepen cooperation and
local commitment to Great Lakes protection.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that no single order of government or sector can re-
solve the problems facing the Great Lakes. A multi-level system that
includes all governments, the private sector, and civil society al-
ready exists and should be expanded. More inclusive policy-making
will help ensure more comprehensive and innovative policies,
more effective implementation, and greater accountability. Recog-
nition of the importance of local governments in the protection of
water quality should begin with the procedures and substantive
provisions of the GLWQA and build on existing structures.
An expanded role for local governments within the GLWQA at
this time fits with legal and political trends occurring in Canada.
Municipalities have growing autonomy, interest, and capacity, al-
though there is much variability between individual local
governments. A more inclusive policy role will only be possible if a
175. Compare Caroline Andrew, Globalization and Local Action, in THE POLITICS OF THE
CITY: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 139, 141 (Timothy L. Thomas ed., 1997), with Robert R.M.
Verchick, Why the Global Environment Needs Local Government: Lessons from the Johannesburg
Summit, 35 URB. LAw. 471, 474-481 (2003).
176. Andrew, supra note 175, at 147.
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number of challenges can be met. Meeting these challenges will
not necessarily be easy, but would be worth the effort.

